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INSURANCE WITHOUT ASSURANCE: STACKING
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE UNDER
COMMERCIAL FLEET POLICIES AFTER Mascarella v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company
Jeremy Vanderloo *
OVERVIEW
Since its inception in 1967, the Uninsured Motorist Act' has been liberally
construed by the Mississippi Supreme Court with a general view toward finding
coverage for the insured, especially when the issue relates to aggregation of
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. The court has allowed a named
insured, or a member of his family, to aggregate or stack uninsured motorist
insurance coverage regardless of whether the available coverages result from a
single multi-vehicle policy or multiple single-vehicle policies. The court has
been somewhat more restrictive in its decisions regarding permissive users of the
insured's vehicle. In those cases, the court has allowed stacking only under sin-
gle multi-vehicle policies, regardless of whether in a commercial or non-com-
mercial context. However, the court's most recent decision regarding multi-
vehicle underinsured motorist coverage stacking under a commercial policy
threatens to upset its prior decisions. This most recent decision may be merely
an attempt to back away from what the court sees as an overly lenient disposition
towards stacking, or it may be a reversal of more than a decade of commercial
stacking law. Unfortunately, the lack of reference to its prior commercial stack-
ing cases, along with apparent inconsistencies among the views of at least one
justice, leaves the full impact of this decision in question.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mascarella v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. addressed the issue of
whether or not an employee using his employer's vehicle could aggregate the
underinsured motorist coverage of all the vehicles covered under the employer's
automobile insurance policy "Claims for coverage by passengers in vehicles
covered by fleet policies or by employees of companies with such insurance
policies have almost uniformly been treated the same as other claims for cover-
age by an occupant of an insured vehicle: the courts have denied requests to
allow stacking the coverages."3 Mississippi has deviated from this viewpoint on
more than one occasion. Yet the Mississippi Supreme Court in Mascarella held
that the injured employee could not stack the coverage on his employer's fleet
because the injured employee was not a named insured under the policy.4 In so
doing, the court appears to have distanced itself from thirteen years of precedent
holding that an employee could stack the benefits of his employer's fleet unin-
sured motorist coverage when the fleet was insured under a single policy.
Therefore, the current status of uninsured motorist stacking law is uncertain.
* J.D., M.B.A. Candidate, May 2004, Mississippi College School of Law; B.S., United States Naval
Academy. The author expresses appreciation to his brother Matthew and to Professor Jeffey J. Jackson for their
assistance and guidance with this Note.
1. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-11-101 to 83-11-111 (1999).
2. Mascarella v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 833 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 2002).
3. ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 13.11 at 775 (rev. 2d ed. 1999).
4. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 580.
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II. FACTS
Kade Mascarella was injured in an automobile accident when Alexander
Sutherland's automobile struck the vehicle Mascarella was driving.5 At the time
of the accident, Mascarella was on the job as an employee of, and driving a car
owned by, Development Concepts, Incorporated [hereinafter Development
Concepts].' The parties agreed the collision resulted from Sutherland's negli-
gence.7 Mascarella's medical expenses from his injuries exceeded $65,000, and
he claimed he would incur substantial future expenses as well.' Sutherland had
liability coverage up to $100,000 per person under a policy issued by
Progressive Insurance Company.' Mascarella's automobile, owned by
Development Concepts, was insured under a single fleet insurance policy issued
by United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company [hereinafter USF&G]. 1" That
policy covered eight vehicles owned by Development Concepts with uninsured
motorist coverage of $25,000 per vehicle per accident.11 Development Concepts
paid separate uninsured motorist premiums for each of these eight vehicles. 2
Mascarella settled with Sutherland for the $100,000 liability policy limit.,3
USF&G paid Mascarella $25,000, representing the uninsured motorist coverage
of the car Mascarella was driving. 4 Subsequently, USF&G claimed that it had
incorrectly paid the $25,000 because Sutherland's automobile did not qualify as
an uninsured or underinsured vehicle.'
Mascarella filed suit against USF&G in United States District Court in
Mississippi.' Mascarella alleged wrongful denial and bad faith denial of unin-
sured motorist benefits. 7 The district court granted USF&G's summary judg-
ment motion. 8 Mascarella appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 9 The Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the
Mississippi Supreme Court: "Whether an injured insured is entitled to stack the
underinsured motorist coverage of other vehicles covered under his fleet policy
thereby making the third-party tortfeasor's vehicle an underinsured motor vehi-
cle."2











16. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 575. See Mascarella v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.
Miss. 1999).
17. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 575.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 575-76.
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Mascarella argued that he should be allowed to stack the uninsured motorist
coverage of all eight vehicles insured by Development Concepts, creating cover-
age of $200,000.1 Since Sutherland's liability coverage was $100,000, stacked
coverage of $200,000 on the vehicle Mascarella was driving would result in
Sutherland's vehicle being classified as underinsured.22 Mascarella claimed he
was due the difference between this stacked coverage and the sums already paid
by both Sutherland and USF&G.2" USF&G argued that Sutherland's vehicle did
not qualify as underinsured because it met neither the statutory nor the policy
definitions of an underinsured vehicle. 4
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
In order to understand how Mascarella has affected the status of uninsured
motorist stacking law as it relates to commercial or fleet policies, it is necessary
to understand the general background of uninsured motorist stacking law in
Mississippi.
A. The Uninsured Motorist Act
Mississippi enacted an uninsured motorist statute for the purpose of provid-
ing compensation to innocent injured motorists for injuries caused by financially
irresponsible motorists. Mississippi Code Annotated sections 83-11-101 through
83-11 -111 comprise the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act. The Act states:
No automobile liability insurance policy or contract shall be
issued or delivered after January 1, 1967, unless it contains an
endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all
sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
for bodily injury or death from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured motor vehicle.
25
The Act made uninsured motorist coverage mandatory, unless declined in writ-
ing.6 The Act also included in its definition of uninsured motor vehicle a vehi-
cle with no bodily injury liability insurance or with coverage in effect that had
been denied by the insurer.
21. Id. at 576. ($25,000 times eight vehicles).
22. Id. See MISS. CODE AtNNr. § 83-11-103(c)(iii) (1999) (An underinsured vehicle is one in which the lia-
bility insurance coverage is less than the limits applicable under the injured person's uninsured motorist cover-
age. Therefore, Mascarella would need any amount of uninsured motorist coverage in excess of $100,000 to
qualify Sutherland as an underinsured motorist, because Sutherland's liability limit was $100,000).
23. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 576.
24. Id.
25. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101(1).
26. Id.
27. Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103(c)(i) - (ii).
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B. Adoption of Insurance Stacking
Stacking refers to the aggregation of coverage for different insurance poli-
cies or separate vehicles. 8 Many jurisdictions allow uninsured motorist stack-
ing, either by statute or through caselaw. 5 The rationale usually cited in support
of stacking is that the insured has paid a premium for coverage, so coverage
should be available to the injured party. 0 Mississippi first allowed stacking of
uninsured motorist insurance in Harthcock v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.1
Mississippi has also adopted certain rules of construction that relate to unin-
sured motorist stacking cases. The most significant is that "policies issued
[under the Uninsured Motorist Act] are to be construed liberally to provide cov-
erage and strictly to avoid or preclude exceptions or exemptions from
coverage." 2 Another important tenet says that "uninsured motorist coverage is
personal to insureds, providing coverage for people and not vehicles."3 These
principles are intended to guide the court in interpreting the Uninsured Motorist
Act and caselaw that addresses the issue of stacking.
C. Statutory Classes of Insured
The stacking issue was compounded in Stevens v. USF&G when the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Uninsured Motorist Act created "two
distinct classes of insured with different coverage accruing to each class."34
Class I insureds consist of the named insured and his or her spouse plus any of
their relatives living in the same household. Class I coverage "against injury
inflicted by uninsured motorists is quite liberal, . . . aris[ing] by virtue of the
phrase 'while in a motor vehicle or otherwise.""'36 Class II insureds consist of
"any person 'who uses, with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named
28. 46a C.J.S. Insurance § 1676 (1993).
29. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4132 (1996) (stacking prohibited except in limited circumstances).
30. Wickline v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 530 So. 2d 708, 714 (Miss. 1988). See also Tissell v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 795 P.2d 126, 127 (Wash. 1990) (fundamental policy behind uninsured motorist protection is com-
plete compensation of injured parties). But see WInIss, supra note 3, § 35.4 at 258 ("Unless there is evidence
that a purchaser was not adequately informed about the nature of the coverage that was offered.., there is lit-
tle, if any, public policy which supports claims by individuals that the coverage limits selected and paid for
should be disregarded.").
31. Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1971).
32. Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 487 So. 2d 1320, 1323 (Miss. 1986) (citing Matthews v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Miss. 1985)).
33. Meadows v. Miss. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 108, 112 (Miss. 1994) (McRae, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nester, 459 So. 2d 787, 793 (Miss. 1984) (quoting JOHN ALLEN APPLEMAN &
JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 5080 (1981))).
34. Stevens v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 345 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Miss. 1977). See also Mullis v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 238 (Fla. 1971) (two classes of insureds); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield,
581 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1979) (two classes of insureds); Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 703 P.2d 889,
892 (N.M. 1985) (two classes of insureds); Andrew Janquitto, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Maryland, 21
U. BALT. L. REV. 171, 222-28 (1992) (three classes of insureds). But see Gerald W. Scott,
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Insurance: A Sleeping Giant, 63 J. KAN. B.A. 28, 33 (1994) (no distinction
between named insured and permissive user).
35. Stevens, 345 So. 2d at 1043. (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103(b)).
36. Id. (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103(b)).
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insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies.' 37 While the court indi-
cated that Class II coverage is not as liberal as Class I coverage, it did not indi-
cate just how broad or narrow Class II coverage is. 8 As will become apparent,
the particular title given to insured persons is often mere semantics, while it is
the substantive rights which accrue to the injured individuals that are the impor-
tant issue."
D. Addition of Underinsured Motorist Protection
The legislature created another series of issues when it provided for underin-
sured motorist protection in 1979. An underinsured vehicle is "[a]n insured
motor vehicle, when the liability insurer of such vehicle has provided limits of
bodily injury liability for its insured which are less than the limits applicable to
the injured person provided under his uninsured motorist coverage."" The criti-
cal question was no longer simply whether the tortfeasor lacked insurance, but
what level of insurance would be credited to each party. Therefore, stacking
became a crucial factor in determining recovery amounts.
E. Stacking of Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Insurance Benefits
1. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Stacking for Class I Insureds Is Liberally
Granted
In Mississippi, "Class I insureds may stack their own coverage without
regard to whether one policy is issued covering multiple vehicles or separate
policies are issued."41 The former is referred to as intrapolicy stacking, while the
latter is referred to as interpolicy stacking.
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts, the Roberts'
minor son was injured while riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle.42 The pas-
senger's parents had three separate insurance policies covering three separate
vehicles.43 The passenger qualified as an uninsured motorist because the driver
of the second vehicle was uninsured.'
The Roberts court allowed the passenger to stack the coverage of all three of
his parents' insurance policies noting that "[a] separate premium was paid for
each policy, and each policy with its uninsured motorist endorsement was com-
plete within itself."' In reaching its conclusion, the court also noted that "if the
37. Id.
38. Overruling the trial court, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Steven's injuries arose out of his use
of the wrecker, and therefore, Stevens was covered as a Class II insured. Stevens, 345 So.2d at 1044.
39. See WiDiss, supra note 3, § 13.11 at 768 (there is a basis for distinguishing the rights of Class I and
Class II insureds).
40. Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103(c)(iii).
41. JEFFERY JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI INSURANCE LAW § 17:18 at 17-38 (2001).
42. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 323 So. 2d 536, 537 (Miss. 1975).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 538.
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question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just
that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather than
that the insurer should escape liability for that for which it collected a
premium."4 The passenger, as a Class I insured of his parents' policies, was
allowed to interpolicy stack the coverage of those policies.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Brown, the plaintiffs, Mr. and
Mrs. Brown, were operating their own vehicle when they were struck by an
uninsured motorist.47 The insurer provided the Browns with a single policy cov-
ering three vehicles for which the Browns paid separate premiums.' The court
held that the insureds were entitled to stack their coverage, reasoning that "a pre-
sumption arises that coverage of multi-vehicles in one policy, where separate
premiums were paid for each endorsement of uninsured motorist coverage, is the
same as if such coverage was provided in separate policies covering the same
vehicles."4 Although the court's holding was limited specifically to a single
policy covering three vehicles, it indicated an openness to ignoring distinctions
between intrapolicy and interpolicy coverage.
In USF&G v. Ferguson, the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in her own
automobile when her vehicle was struck by a third party tortfeasor5s The tort-
feasor had $25,000 in liability insurance on her vehicle.51 The plaintiff insureds
had a single policy covering three vehicles, including the accident vehicle. 2 The
insureds had previously paid separate premiums for each vehicle, but at the time
of the accident, they paid a single higher premium for their coverage." The
insureds sought to stack the coverage of all three of their vehicles,54 as Class I
insureds. The insurance company claimed it was not required to stack the cover-
age on the insureds' three vehicles because the policy had an unambiguous anti-
stacking clause.55
However, the court allowed the insured to stack the coverage, stating "the
public policy of this State mandates stacking of [uninsured motorist] coverage
for every vehicle covered under a policy, regardless of the number or amount of
the premium(s) paid for [that] coverage."" Whereas the insured parties had paid
their insurance company to cover all three of their cars with uninsured motorist
coverage, the insurer was liable to the insured for that coverage when a valid
claim was made. 7 In this case, the court allowed the Class I insured to intrapoli-
cy stack.
46. Id. (quoting Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Minn. 1973)).
47. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Miss. 1984)
48. Id. at 1005.
49. Id. at 1006. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So. 2d 1379 (Miss. 1977).






56. Ferguson, 698 So. 2d at 79.
57. Id. at 80.
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These cases illustrate how the Mississippi Supreme Court generally grants
broad stacking to Class I insureds, who are persons named in the policy or rela-
tives of the named insured living in the same household. But the court does not
grant the same latitude to permissive users, called Class II insureds."s
2. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Stacking for Class II Insureds Is Not as
Broad as Class I Stacking
In Mississippi, "[u]nder the usual rule, a permissive user or guest passenger
in a vehicle may only stack the host's [uninsured motorist] coverage if the host's
policy provides multi-vehicle coverage under a single policy." 9 That is to say, a
Class II insured is generally only allowed intrapolicy stacking of uninsured
60motorist coverage.
In Wickline v. USF&G, the plaintiffs daughter was killed when the vehicle
in which she was a passenger collided with a vehicle parked on the side of the
road.6 ' The driver was covered under his father's insurance, issued by the
defendant USF&G.2 The driver's father had four automobiles under the same
policy, each paid with separate premiums. 3 The passenger's parents were
insured through two of their own policies issued through State Farm Insurance
Company.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the passenger could stack the dri-
ver's insurance coverages to qualify a tortfeasor as underinsured because "[t]he
Mississippi statutory definition of uninsured motor vehicle, as amended to incor-
porate the underinsured concept, compares the limits of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage to 'the limits applicable to the injured person provided under his unin-
sured motorist coverage.""'65 The court described those limits by holding that
"[ilf an injured person is insured under more than one policy of uninsured
motorist insurance, the limits of each such policy are 'applicable' to him.
'66
Finally, the court overruled the trial court by holding that "all classes [of] statu-
tory insureds may recover of the [] insurer all amounts he or she may be entitled
to recover as damages from the uninsured motorist, limited only by the limits of
[uninsured motorist] coverage multiplied by the number of vehicles insured by
the policy. 6' Therefore, the court allowed the passenger to stack her family
58. See Joseph Nanney, Jr., Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.: The North Carolina Supreme Court
Approves Stacking of Underinsured Motorist Coverage-Will Uninsured Coverage Follow?, 68 N.C. L. REv.
1281, 1292 (1990) (addressing reasons why jurisdictions reject Class II stacking).
59. JACKSON, supra note 41, § 17:18 at 17-38. But cf Hampton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 P.2d 78 (Ariz.
1980); General Accident Ins. Co. v. St. Peter, 482 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Super. 1984); Abshere v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
683 P.2d 625 (Wash. App. 1984) (permissive user denied intrapolicy stacking).
60. However, when a permissive user has his own uninsured motorist coverage, his own coverage can be
stacked with the coverage on the accident vehicle since the permissive user is a Class I insured as to his own
uninsured motorist policy. This is regardless of whether or not the permissive user is entitled to stack the insur-
ance coverage of the accident vehicle owner's other vehicle(s).




65. Id. at 713 (quoting § 83-11-103(c)(iii)).
66. Id. (citing Harthcock, 248 So. 2d 456).
67. Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 715.
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vehicle coverage with the coverage of the four vehicles insured under the dri-
ver's family policy,6" which constitutes intrapolicy stacking by a Class II
insured.
In Thiac v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the plaintiff was
seriously injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile.69 The driver had
two separate insurance policies covering the accident vehicle and a separate
vehicle.7 The passenger did not have any of her own automobile liability insur-
ance.
71
The Mississippi Supreme Court denied uninsured motorist coverage to the
passenger, "recogniz[ing] that for the purpose of establishing whether an insured
host vehicle is, in fact, underinsured, we look no further than the guest passen-
ger's own coverage and the coverage on the host vehicle. 72 Since the passenger
had no insurance coverage of her own to stack with the driver's liability cover-
age, the accident vehicle was not underinsured.73 However, the court upheld
Wickline, noting that once a host vehicle qualifies as uninsured, the passenger
can stack the coverage of all vehicles under the host driver's policy to recover
damages.74 Therefore, the Thiac court indicated that interpolicy stacking of a
driver's insurance would be allowed for damages only, after the host vehicle
qualified as either uninsured or underinsured.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Davis, the court further
distinguished the stacking guidelines established by Wickline.7 ' The Davis'
minor child was killed while riding as a passenger in a pick-up truck.7" The
owner of the pick-up truck had separate insurance policies on the accident vehi-
cle and two other vehicles.' The passenger's parents had three insurance poli-
cies on three vehicles that covered their child at the time of the accident.78 The
passenger's parents sought to stack the coverage from all six policies, and the
trial court allowed them to do so.7
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that stack-
ing was inappropriate as to the driver's other insurance policies. The court noted
that stacking of those policies was not allowed because the passenger was not an
insured under those policies due to the fact that she was not a guest passenger in
either of the driver's other vehicles.8" The court distinguished Davis from
Wickline, noting that in Wickline the four cars were covered under the same poli-
cy, while in Davis the cars were insured under separate policies.81 Therefore, the
68. Id. at 713 (citing Roberts, 323 So. 2d 536).
69. Thiac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Miss. 1990).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1221.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1220.
75. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 613 So. 2d 1179 (Miss. 1992).




80. Id. at 1181.
81. Davis, 613 So. 2dat 1182.
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passenger could interpolicy stack her parents' policies as a Class I insured, but
she could not interpolicy stack the driver's policies as a Class II insured of those
policies.
In Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., the plaintiff s wife was driving an auto-
mobile owned and insured by the plaintiffs father when she was killed in an
accident caused by a third party.82 That tortfeasor had $10,000 in liability insur-
ance.' The plaintiffs father had a single insurance policy covering both the
accident vehicle and a second vehicle.a' The plaintiff sought to stack the cover-
age of both of his father's vehicles.85
The court allowed the plaintiff to stack the coverage,86 extending the hold-
ing of GEICO v. Brown. The court held that the driver was a Class II insured of
the policy by virtue of her use of the covered vehicle.8" Relying on precedent,
the court said, "[t]he justification for stacking lies not in who has paid for the
extra protection, but rather that the protection has been purchased. The benefits
flow to all persons insured."88 Therefore, the court allowed a Class II insured to
intrapolicy stack the uninsured motorist coverage of the accident vehicle
owner.
89
In Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., the plaintiff was a passenger in a car
owned by her mother but driven by a third party. The driver's parents were
insured under a single policy that included four vehicles owned by them.91 The
passenger's mother insured the accident vehicle under a single policy that also
included a second vehicle. 2 The passenger sought to stack the coverage of the
driver's four automobiles.93 The court denied stacking on the grounds that the
passenger was not an insured under any of the driver's four vehicles because the
passenger was not using any of the driver's vehicles at the time of the accident.94
Therefore, the passenger could not stack uninsured motorist coverage on the dri-
ver's single policy because the passenger was neither a Class I nor a Class II
insured of the driver's policy.
In Meadows v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Insurance Co., the plaintiff's minor
son sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident while riding as a passen-
ger.9" The vehicle owner's son was driving the automobile." The driver's par-
ents had a total of six separate insurance policies providing uninsured motorist
coverage on the accident vehicle and five other vehicles.97 The trial court denied
82. Brown v. Md. Cas. Co., 521 So. 2d 854, 854 (Miss. 1987).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 855.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 856.
87. Id. (citing Stevens, 345 So. 2d at 1043 (quoting § 83-11-103(b))).
88. Brown v. Md. Cas., 521 So. 2d at 856 (quoting Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co., 628 P.2d 659, 662 (Mont.
1981)).
89. Id. at 857.
90. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 631 So. 2d 789, 790 (Miss. 1994).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 793.
93. Id. at 790.
94. Id. at791.




MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
the passenger's request to stack all of the driver's coverages on the grounds that
the passenger was not insured under the five vehicles not involved in the acci-
dent.9" The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, say-
ing "Class 2 [insureds] are granted restrictive rights and are afforded coverage
only by virtue of their occupancy of the particular vehicle at the time of the acci-
dent."99 Therefore, the Class II insured could not interpolicy stack the underin-
sured motorist coverage.
These cases illustrate that, outside a commercial context at least, "[t]he right
of the Class II insured to stack the host's coverage depends entirely on whether
the host has one policy covering a number of vehicles, or separate policies cov-
ering a single vehicle."'10 The rule appeared to be clear in Mississippi that a
Class II insured may intrapolicy stack but may not interpolicy stack uninsured
motorist coverage.1 1 The recent decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, in
Mascarella, questions the veracity of this rule as it applies to uninsured motorist
coverage stacking under commercial policies.
3. Commercial Stacking
"Under some commercial fleet policies, only Class I insureds ... may stack
uninsured motorist coverage, and Class II insureds... are only entitled to single
vehicle uninsured motorist coverage.""1 2 However, prior to its most recent deci-
sion in Mascarella, Mississippi did not always follow this convention.
Apparently applying its liberal rules of construction toward providing cover-
age,"' a the Mississippi Supreme Court first allowed stacking of uninsured
motorist coverage under a commercial policy in Cossitt v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.1"4 The three plaintiffs, while on a church trip and using a bus
insured under a single commercial policy issued to that church, were struck on
the side of the road by a third party."' The church paid separate premiums for
the three buses insured by the defendant insurance company.0 8
The plaintiffs, as Class II insureds, sought to stack the uninsured motorist
coverages of all three of the church's buses.1"7 Although the insurer conceded
98. Id. at 109. However, the court did allow the driver, as a Class I insured, to stack the coverage under his
parents' five other vehicles. Id. at 109-10.
99. Id. at 110 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Barker, 451 So. 2d 731, 734 (Miss. 1984); Lowery v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 767, 771 (Miss. 1973)).
100. JACKSON, supra note 41, § 17:18 at 17-39.
101. For additional examples, see Pearthtree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So. 2d 267 (Miss.
1979); Bridges, 350 So. 2d 1379.
102. LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE (3d) § 169:53 at 169-114 (1998). See also
Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Combining or "Stacking" Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided in Fleet
Policy, 25 A.L.R. 4TH 896, 899 (1983) ("Stacking of uninsured, or underinsured, motorist coverages under a
multivehicle policy covering vehicles used in a business . . . has generally not been allowed where the injured
party, usually an employee, was neither a named insured or relative residing in his household, nor a designated
insured, mentioned by name within the policy.").
103. See discussion supra Part III.B.
104. Cossitt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 551 So. 2d 879 (Miss. 1989).
105. Id. at 880.
106. Id. at 884.
107. Id. at 880, 883. Although the plaintiffs were not actually occupying the bus at the time of the accident,
since both parties stipulated that plaintiffs were Class II insureds, the court treated them so. Id. at 884.
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that plaintiffs were Class II insureds, the insurer argued that only Class I insureds
could stack policy coverage, or alternatively, that stacking was not allowed
under fleet or commercial policies. 0' The church was the named insured, so
there were no individual Class I insureds under the policy."9
The Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that the usual rationale
behind not stacking commercial fleet policies was that the amount of insurance
coverage provided by stacking could not reasonably be supported by the premi-
ums paid."' However, the court also recognized that these concerns were not
persuasive when the fleets involved were no larger than might be owned by a
single family. " The court reasoned that because the insured had paid three pre-
miums for its three vehicles and was the only designated named insured, the
insured should have the same expectation of stacking as an individual policy-
holder.12 The court allowed stacking of the insured's coverage for the passen-
gers as Class II insureds, noting that "[the insured] might reasonably be said to
have an even greater expectation of stacking for Class II insureds in light of [the
insurer's] claim that there are no Class I insureds under the policy..11 3
Therefore, the court allowed intrapolicy stacking by Class II insureds (passen-
gers) under a commercial fleet policy when the number of vehicles insured under
that single policy was comparable to that owned by a single family."
In Harris v. Magee, the employee was enroute to a job-site in his employer's
vehicle, when he stopped on the highway to repair his employer's broken down
crane on the shoulder of the highway."' The employee was struck and killed by
a third party tortfeasor's automobile while he was crawling from beneath the
crane."' The tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist. " 7 The employer had a single
business automobile policy that provided insurance for the employer's twenty-
two vehicles, but did not cover the crane.'18 The employee also owned three
vehicles, two of which were separately insured under separate policies. 9
The employee's wife sought to stack the uninsured motorist coverage of all
of the employer's vehicles. 20 The insurer argued that Class II insureds should
not be allowed to stack coverage of large commercial fleets. 21
108. Id. at 884.
109. Id. at 883.
110. Cossit, 551 So. 2d at 884 (citing Howell v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 109, 113 (Md. 1986)).
See also APPLEMAN, supra note 33, § 5101 at 449 ("If it is not reasonable to argue for doubling or tripling of
liability limits when there is a single policy owner, and a single company, then it is not reasonable to urge such
a position for uninsured motorist coverages.").
111. Cossitt, 551 So.2d at 884. This holding was originally read as being limited to fleets of no more than
seven vehicles because "many individuals have from three to seven vehicles.., on one policy for family use.'"
Id.
112. Id. (citing Brown v. Md. Cas. Co.).
113. Id.
114. See Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 102, § 169:53 at 169-114 ("Whether Class 2 insureds are allowed to
stack [under commercial policies] often depends on whether the legislature has enacted liberal stacking rules.").
115. Harris v. Magee, 573 So. 2d 646, 648 (Miss. 1990).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 649.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Harris, 573 So. 2dat 652.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirmed the public policy rationale that
stacking is intended "to provide protection to innocent motorists injured by
financially irresponsible drivers up to the extent of their injuries." '122 The court
also reiterated that "the Uninsured Motorist Act must be 'construed liberally to
provide coverage and strictly to avoid or preclude exceptions or exemptions
from coverage."' 123 Applying these principles, the court then allowed stacking
of the employer's uninsured motorist coverage noting that "[t]his Court, in inter-
preting [the uninsured motorist] statute, has recognized, as a general rule, that all
classes of statutory insureds are allowed to stack uninsured motorist cover-
age.
124
In trying to minimize any previous distinctions between commercial and
individual policies, the court also noted that the "legislature has not seen fit to
distinguish a 'commercial fleet' policy from any other auto policy" and "[t]he
legislature has not statutorily overruled [the court's] stacking decisions.""12 The
court found further justification for its decision by noting the "primary impor-
tance [of] the fact that a proposal which would prohibit the stacking of insurance
policies was recently rejected through [the] legislative process. '"126 The court
also held that "[a]s there are no statutory distinctions between the various types
of auto policies in our [uninsured motorist] statute, this Court refuses to distin-
guish them jurisprudentially.1 2 7 Consequently, the Harris court extended
intrapolicy stacking for a Class II insured (permissive driver) under a commer-
cial fleet policy to include larger fleets, indicating that commercial stacking
questions would be answered in the same manner as under an individual or fami-
ly policy.
The Mississippi Supreme Court continued its liberal construction of unin-
sured motorist law in McDaniel v. Shaklee United States, Inc. 128 The plaintiff
was struck by another vehicle while driving an automobile owned by the
insured.1 29 The insured had "loaned" the car to the driver, who paid the insured
for comprehensive and uninsured motorist coverage on the loaned vehicle.13
The tortfeasor that collided with the driver had liability insurance of $25,000.1
The insured had self-insured for the first $500,000 in coverage and had addition-
122. Id. at 654 (citing Stevens, 345 So. 2d at 1043).
123. Id. (quoting Garrett, 487 So. 2d at 1323).
124. Id. at 652 (citing Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 715) (emphasis added). (The employer's insurance carrier had
also argued the employee was not an insured because he was neither occupying a covered vehicle at the time of
the accident, nor was there evidence that he was "getting in" a covered vehicle. The court determined that the
employee was a Class II insured because he was performing duties directly related to the use of the vehicle.
Harris, 573 So. 2d at 651).
125. Id. at 653.
126. Id. at 655.
127. Harris, 573 So. 2d at 652. See generally Michael V. Cory, Jr. & Lanny R. Pace, Mississippi Uninsured
Motorist Law -Where Do We Go from Here?, 69 Miss. L.J. 455, 476-77 (1999) ("Based on this language, it
would appear that the court will utilize the same stacking principles in interpreting a fleet policy (regardless of
the number of vehicles insured on the premium charged) as it would any other policy.").
128. McDaniel v. Shaklee U.S., Inc., 807 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 2001).





al comprehensive coverage provided for all 1,758 vehicles in its fleet under a
single policy.132
The driver sought to stack the uninsured motorist coverage of the insured's
entire fleet.133 The insurer argued that the driver was a Class I insured of the
accident vehicle but was not an insured of any of the remaining fleet based upon
the policy. 34 The insurer also argued that the driver's payment for insurance
constituted a separate policy on the loaned vehicle which precluded stacking. 3
Finally, the insurer argued that the driver should not be able to stack because he
was not an employee of the insured, but merely an independent distributor. 36
The McDaniel court, with Justice Easley concurring, allowed the driver to
stack the coverage of the fleet policy. ' The court rejected the argument that the
driver was covered by a separate policy, citing the fact that the vehicle was
owned, operated, and insured by the same entity. 38 The court also dismissed the
defendant's argument concerning the driver's status as a Class II insured, noting
that "Brown and Wickline reveal that there is no basis for insured classification
whatsoever." '139 The court held that the driver was an insured, under both the
policy and the statute, by virtue of the fact that he used the vehicle with the
insured's consent. 4 ' In fact, the court indicated that in order to qualify as a
statutory insured, all that is necessary is permissive use of the covered vehicle.41
The court went on to state that "[a]s an 'insured' under the [Uninsured Motorist]
Act, [the driver] should be allowed to stack all of the coverage under the
[insured's] policy in order to qualify [the tortfeasor] as an underinsured
motorist."' 42 The court reasoned that "the justification for stacking lies not in
who has paid for the extra protection, but rather that the protection has been pur-
chased." '43 The court went even further by proclaiming that "[the driver's] sta-
tus as an independent distributor is immaterial, just as the commercial nature of
the policy is immaterial."'" Finally, because "public policy demand[ed] stack-
ing be allowed" for the driver, the court allowed him to stack all the coverage
under the insured's policy. 4
The McDaniel dissent, joined by Justice Cobb, stated that "Class II insureds
should not be permitted to stack coverage in situations involving large commer-
cial fleets."'46 "In cases involving commercial fleet policies, it can hardly be
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 397.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 399.
138. Id. at 397.
139. Id. at 398.
140. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 398.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Brown v. Md. Cas. Co., 521 So.2d at 856). But see APPLEMAN, supra note 33, § 5106 at
531 ("[T]he proper rule remains that liability is not increased by the fact that a separate premium was charged
for each such coverage relating to the [] vehicles.").
144. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 398 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 398, 399.
146. Id. at 399.
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argued that the amount of coverage sought by parties such as [the driver] could
reasonably be supported by the premium which has been paid."" 7 The dissent
reasoned that allowing stacking in large commercial fleets would burden the
insurance company with too high an exposure for the relatively low premium
received.14
The McDaniel court allowed intrapolicy stacking by a Class II insured (per-
missive driver) under a commercial fleet policy so long as the party seeking to
stack is a statutory insured under the policy. Such an outcome should result in
any permissive user being allowed to stack the uninsured motorist coverage of
every vehicle under a single policy. However, the Mascarella decision appears
to challenge this assertion.
In Glennon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the plaintiff
employee was injured when the vehicle in which she was riding was struck by
another automobile.149 The passenger was using a vehicle owned by her employ-
er and was enroute to a job-site.5 The passenger was covered under her own
uninsured motorist insurance with a $10,000 limit.15 ' The employer also had
insurance coverage on its three vehicles through three separate policies, with a
$25,000 per vehicle limit.152 The tortfeasor had $25,000 in liability coverage. 53
The employee sought to stack the coverages of all three of her employer's
insurance policies, arguing that she was a Class II insured by virtue of her use of
the vehicle. 54 The insurer refused to pay uninsured motorist coverage on the two
vehicles not involved in the accident, arguing that Class II insureds have never
been allowed interpolicy stacking.1
5
The Mississippi Supreme Court, with Justice Cobb concurring, did not allow
the employee to stack the coverages." 6 The court held that "[w]hile admittedly
Wickline and Cossitt did somewhat blur the distinction between Class I and
Class II insureds, subsequent decisions have clearly reestablished that these clas-
sifications are firmly embedded in our law."'5 7 Because the employee was not
named in her employer's policy, she could not be a Class I insured under the pol-
icy. 5 ' The court noted that "a Class II insured-often called a 'permissive user'
or 'guest passenger'- is only covered because he or she is in the covered auto-
mobile."' 59 The court further went on to point out that "[the Mississippi
Supreme] Court has never permitted a Class II insured, employee or otherwise,
to stack the [uninsured motorist] coverage of separate policies covering vehicles
147. Id. at 400.
148. Id.






155. Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 929. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pac, 337 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that a permissive user is not allowed to interpolicy stack coverage for lack of relationship with any
other insured vehicle).
156. Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 930-31.
157. Id. at 931.




they were not occupying at the time of the accident.""16 Therefore, the court held
that the employee, as a Class II insured, could not stack the uninsured motorist
coverage of the employer's other two vehicles not involved in the accident.161
The dissent in Glennon, joined by Justice Easley, stated that "[b]ecause class
status is irrelevant to the issue of [uninsured motorist] coverage, we have previ-
ously held that separate policies may be stacked, and to disallow coverage is
against public policy." '62 Therefore, the dissent would have allowed interpolicy
stacking for either Class I or Class II insureds."3
The Glennon court rejected interpolicy stacking by a Class II insured (pas-
senger) under a commercial fleet policy due to the fact that a Class II insured is
not a statutory insured of any fleet vehicle other than the vehicle occupied at the
time of the accident. Up to this point, the court had upheld the general rules
regarding intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking. That is to say, a Class I insured
was allowed to stack in either an interpolicy or intrapolicy situation, while a
Class II insured was only allowed intrapolicy stacking. However, Mascarella
may have muddled this convention.
IV. INSTANT CASE
The employee driver, Mascarella, argued that he should be allowed to stack
the uninsured motorist coverage of all eight vehicles insured by his employer,
creating coverage of $200,000.1 Since the third party tortfeasor's liability cov-
erage was $100,000, stacked coverage of $200,000 on the vehicle Mascarella
was driving would result in the tortfeasor's vehicle being classified as underin-
sured. '65 Mascarella claimed he was due the difference between this stacked
coverage and the sums already paid by both the tortfeasor and the insurer. 6 The
insurer argued that the tortfeasor's vehicle did not qualify as underinsured,
because it met neither the statutory nor the policy definitions of an underinsured
vehicle. 67
The Mississippi Supreme Court, with Justice Easley concurring, and Justice
Cobb concurring in part, ignored the insurance class distinctions of the parties.
The court held that there was no need to distinguish between Class I and Class II
insured parties when determining whether or not a vehicle is underinsured.166
160. Id. at 932-33. See also WIDISS, supra note 3, § 40.6 at 396 ("[T]here is a compelling case that the pur-
chaser shares the insurer's expectation that the underinsured motorist insurance coverage acquired as part of the
fleet policy will not be 'stacked."').
161. Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 933.
162. Id. at 934.
163. Id.
164. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 576.
165. Id. See supra note 22.
166. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 576.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 578. See also Box v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 54, 58 (Miss. 1997);
Guardianship of Lacy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 649 So. 2d 195, 198 (Miss. 1995); Davis, 613 So. 2d at 1180-81.
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The court said the only coverage applicable to an injured person is "the unin-
sured motorist coverage of the vehicle in which he is riding, [and] that of his
own vehicles.""16 The court rejected the employee's claim that stacking of the
underinsured motorist coverages should be allowed, holding that "an injured
insured may stack the [uninsured motorist] coverage of vehicles covered under
his own fleet policy with the [uninsured motorist] coverage of the vehicle in
which he is a passenger in order to have the third party tortfeasor's vehicle
declared underinsured.""17 Comparing him to the plaintiff in Thiac,"' the court
said that Mascarella could not stack uninsured motorist coverage, because "hav-
ing no [uninsured motorist] coverage of his own, [Mascarella had] nothing to
stack with the [uninsured motorist] coverage of the car he was driving in order to
compare that sum with [the tortfeasor's] bodily injury liability limits." '172 The
court therefore found that the tortfeasor's vehicle was not underinsured.73
The dissent in Mascarella, joined in part by Justice Cobb, argued that
"Mascarella should be allowed to stack the uninsured motorist coverage of his
employer as an insured and intended beneficiary of the policy." 74 The dissent
reasoned that since the terms of the Uninsured Motorist Act are written into
every insurance policy, Mascarella fell within the statutory definition of an
insured." 5
The Mascarella court, apparently adopting the rationale of Glennon, rejected
intrapolicy stacking by a Class II insured (permissive driver) under a commer-
cial fleet policy due to the fact that a Class II insured is not a statutory insured of
any fleet vehicle other than the vehicle occupied at the time of the accident.
Such an outcome is at odds with the general rule stated earlier and reinforced
numerous times by the Mississippi Supreme Court.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Impact on the Status of the Law
Having addressed the issue of uninsured motorist stacking as it relates to
commercial policies on only four previous occasions, one might expect to see
the court fashioning a logical approach for dealing with this issue. Such is not
the case. Mascarella deals with an area of the law that is, by the Mississippi
Supreme Court's own admission, full of "apparent contradictions and ambigui-
ties within the caselaw." 75 Unfortunately, the Mascarella Court seems to add to
that list of contradictions.
169. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 577 (quoting Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 713; citing Roberts, 323 So. 2d 536).
170. Id. at 580.
171. Thiac, 569 So. 2dat 1221.
172. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 580.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 581.
175. Id.
176. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 396. See also Cory, Jr. & Pace, supra note 127, at 455 ("Rather than interpret-
ing and applying the statutory language as written, over the years the Mississippi Supreme Court has compli-
cated and materially altered the scope and reach of this legislation.").
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1. The Affect of Mascarella on Prior Court Decisions
A. The Mascarella court focused on a judicially created two-part analysis intro-
duced in Wickline but not used in commercial stacking decisions prior to
Mascarella.
In many of the court's stacking decisions prior to Mascarella, the outcome
seemed predetermined by the level of emphasis the court placed on the statutory
class categorization of the insured. 177 While the titles that are given to the
injured party are merely semantic, the privileges that accrue are substantive.
Mascarella minimized the issue of statutory class distinction and yet still prohib-
ited stacking. The court did so by emphasizing a judicially created two-part test,
the development of which was credited to Wickline 7  That test asks two ques-
tions: First, whether the tortfeasor's vehicle is either uninsured or underinsured;
and second, whether the injured party may stack the uninsured motorist coverage
of the accident vehicle. 
179
The Mascarella court said that the first question was a threshold question,
the settlement of which did not require a need to distinguish between statutory
classes. 8 ' "The only requirement is that the injured party is insured by the poli-
cy from which he seeks recovery or meets the definition of 'insured' found at
Miss[issippi] Code Ann[otated] [section] 83-11-103(b) (1999).'"181
Wickline is an example of a case where the court minimized statutory class
distinctions and allowed uninsured motorist stacking for a permissive user, also
called a Class II insured. After addressing the issue of whether the vehicle was
underinsured, the court stated that, "[t]he question presented here is whether a
guest passenger can aggregate the owner's coverages on the owner's other vehi-
cles." 82 The court did not need to address the issue of whether the passenger
could stack the driver's uninsured motorist coverage to qualify the accident
vehicle as underinsured, because the passenger already qualified for underin-
sured motorist protection based on her own insurance coverage. The court, in
considering whether the plaintiffs could stack, held that "[t]he sort of stacking
here sought, i.e., stacking multiple coverages within a single policy, has been
mandated." '83
However, the court did not rely on its recently created test from Wickline
when it decided Cossitt. Although Cossitt dealt with an underinsured motorist
stacking issue, the court made no mention whatsoever of the mandatory two-part
stacking test. While it is true that the plaintiffs in Cossitt qualified for underin-
177. Compare McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 398 (holding permissive user could stack coverage because there is
"no basis for insured classification whatsoever"), with Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 931 (holding passenger could not
stack because insured "classifications are firmly embedded in [Mississippi] law").




182. Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 713 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 714 (citing GEICO v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002; Pearthtree, 373 So. 2d 267; Bridges, 350 So. 2d
1379).
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sured motorist protection without stacking,"s4 it seems strange that the court
would not want to take an opportunity to emphasize a stacking test which had
been judicially created less than a year before the Cossitt decision.
In Harris, the tortfeasor who struck the employee was an uninsured
motorist, s' so the threshold question of whether the accident vehicle was under-
insured was moot, and understandably not addressed.
In McDaniel, the court again addressed an underinsured motorist stacking
issue. The employer's vehicle was covered by $10,000 of uninsured motorist
coverage under his fleet policy.186 The tortfeasor had $25,000 of liability cover-
age.1"7 Therefore, the employer's vehicle could not be underinsured without
stacking coverage. The court made no reference to its two-part test, but instead
focused on prior decisions regarding whether or not the injured person was an
"insured" under the policy at issue. Finding the employee to be an "insured" by
virtue of his use of the employer's vehicle, the court followed precedent and
allowed intrapolicy stacking for the employee because "[a]s an 'insured' under
the [Uninsured Motorist] Act, [the driver] should be allowed to stack all of the
coverage under [his employer's] policy in order to qualify [the tortfeasor] as an
underinsured motorist."'88 Far from referencing its two-part test, the court com-
pletely ignored it, seeming to make the threshold question irrelevant by allowing
stacking in order to qualify the tortfeasor's vehicle as underinsured.
Once again, it seems odd that the court failed to mention this two-part test
when evaluating the underinsured motorist status in Glennon. In this case, the
plaintiff would not have qualified the accident vehicle as underinsured without
having stacked her own coverage with that of the accident vehicle.18 However,
the Glennon court missed another opportunity to either reinforce its judicially
created test or explain McDaniel's impact, especially considering the proximity
of the Glennon decision with the contrary rule announced by McDaniel.
Therefore the question raised is whether McDaniel was overruled by
Mascarella. This would seem to be the required result if the Wickline test con-
stitutes a threshold question for each stacking case. But due to a lack of any ref-
erence to McDaniel in its Mascarella decision, this question is unanswered.
B. Mascarella reversed a thirteen-year trend that had been gradually expanding
uninsured motorist stacking privileges in commercial policies.
In previous cases dealing with commercial intrapolicy uninsured motorist
coverage stacking, the Mississippi Supreme Court has, in all three instances,
allowed the Class II insured to stack the covered entity's uninsured motorist cov-
184. Cossitt, 551 So. 2d at 881.
185. Harris, 573 So. 2d at 648.
186. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 395.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 398.
189. The torfeasor had $25,000 in liability coverage, the employer had $25,000 in uninsured motorist cover-
age, and the employee had $10,000 in liability insurance. Since the tortfeasor's insurance equaled the unin-
sured motorist coverage on the employer's vehicle, the tortfeasor could not be an underinsured motorist unless
the employer's coverage was stacked with the employee's coverage. Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 929.
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erage."9° However, in Mascarella, the court denied the Class II insured the abili-
ty to stack the coverage of his employer's single policy.191 The immediate ques-
tions raised are whether the court abandoned thirteen years of precedent, and if
so, what compelled the court to do so?
Cossitt is distinguishable in some respects from Mascarella, but not to a
meaningful degree. In Cossitt, the injured persons were the driver and two other
passengers on the church bus.192 Unlike Mascarella, the passengers in Cossitt
were not employees of the church, as was the driver, nor was there any apparent
agency relationship between the church and the two passengers.193 The Cossitt
passengers were permissive users of the bus, presumably for the sole purpose of
their own enjoyment. Yet, the Cossitt court felt compelled, by prior decisions
and by public policy, to allow the passengers the protections of the church's
uninsured motorist protection, specifically noting the absence of any Class I
insureds under the policy. 94 The Cossitt court allowed intrapolicy stacking for
Class II insureds under a commercial fleet policy.
In Harris, the facts are much more similar to Mascarella. Both the Harris
and Mascarella employees worked for the policyholder, operating the employ-
er's vehicle for job-related purposes. 99 The Harris court found the employee to
be a Class II insured as a permissive user. 96 The Harris court also felt com-
pelled to allow the employee's widow to stack the coverage of twenty-two vehi-
cles covered by the employer's single policy, refusing to distinguish between
types of policies. 97 The Harris court, therefore, also allowed intrapolicy stack-
ing for a Class II insured under a commercial fleet policy.
Eleven years later, the court once again upheld intrapolicy commercial
stacking, in McDaniel. The facts of that case have the greatest similarity to
Mascarella of any of the prior cases. Both injured persons were driving their
employer's vehicle on job-related business at the time of the accident, and nei-
ther one was a named insured of the policy under which stacking was sought. 99
McDaniel was not even an employee of the policyholder but rather only an inde-
pendent distributor, 99 so arguably he would have less of an expectation of stack-
ing the vehicle owner's policies. Yet the McDaniel court allowed the driver to
stack the uninsured motorist coverage of almost two thousand vehicles, many of
which were not even located in Mississippi."' Further, the McDaniel court
appeared to have settled the issue raised in Mascarella by its broad proclamation
that stacking should be allowed under a commercial policy in order to qualify
the tortfeasor as an uninsured motorist."1 The McDaniel court seemed to restrict
190. See McDaniel, 807 So. 2d 393; Harris, 573 So. 2d 646; Cossitt, 551 So. 2d 879.
191. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 579.
192. Cossitt, 551 So. 2d at 880.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 884.
195. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 576; Harris, 573 So. 2d at 648.
196. Harris, 573 So. 2d at 651.
197. Id. at 652-53.
198. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 576; McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 395.
199. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 395
200. Id. at 398-99.
201. Id. at 398.
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further analysis to the sole question of whether the party seeking to stack cover-
age was using the covered vehicle." 2 In doing so, the court indicated a broad
willingness to allow intrapolicy stacking for a Class 1I insured under a commer-
cial fleet policy."'
Mascarella appeared to reverse the trend established by these prior commer-
cial intrapolicy stacking cases. The line of interpolicy stacking cases in
Mississippi prior to Mascarella would support the Mascarella court's decision if
Mascarella involved separate insurance policies.0 4 However, following the line
of cases involving multi-coverage single policy stacking is much more likely to
result in a decision to allow stacking." Strangely, the Mascarella court largely
overlooked its prior intrapolicy stacking cases, instead focusing more closely on
its prior interpolicy stacking cases. Perhaps most perplexing, the Mascarella
court did not even seem to acknowledge the existence of its pro-stacking deci-
sions in Cossitt, Harris and McDaniel. One possible conclusion is that the court
believed that its stacking decisions had gone too far in the direction of allowing
stacking and sought to rein in those decisions.2"' Unfortunately, it is unclear
how tight of a constriction the court intended, due to a lack of any allusion to its
prior intrapolicy commercial stacking cases.
2. The Affect of Mascarella on Future Court Decisions
A. Mascarella created uncertainty in the court's decision-making process
Mascarella is noteworthy for its potential to cause future problems within
this area of the law. Most importantly, Mascarella does very little to promote
certainty in questions regarding uninsured motorist vehicle stacking. This
uncertainty is due in no small part to the voting pattern of Justice Easley. In
McDaniel, Justice Easley concurred with the majority in allowing intrapolicy
commercial stacking for McDaniel, a Class II insured.2"7 In Glennon, Justice
Easley joined the dissent in support of interpolicy commercial stacking for
Glennon, also a Class II insured.0 ' However, Justice Easley also concurred with
the majority in Mascarella to deny intrapolicy stacking to Mascarella, another
Class II insured.2 9 The potential for confusion here seems apparent: in
McDaniel, the justices were split five to three, with one justice not participating;
in Glennon, the justices were split five to four; and in Mascarella, the justices
were split five to three, with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part.
When the court's opinions are decided by such narrow margins, the consistency
of the justices becomes much more important.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 114.
204. See Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 933 (rejecting interpolicy stacking of commercial policy); JACKSON, supra
note 41, § 17:18 at 17-38 to 17-39 ("Class II insured is not allowed to stack the host's coverage under other
policies.").
205. See McDaniel, 807 So. 2d 393; Harris, 573 So. 2d 646; Cossitt, 551 So. 2d 879.
206. See APPLEMAN, supra note 33, at § 5101 ("It is time for those courts, which have been so generous with
the funds of others, to take a new look at this problem.").
207. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 399.
208. Glennon, 812 So. 2d at 933.
209. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 580.
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As previously discussed, there are several justifications for distinguishing
between intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking.21 Some states allow only interpol-
icy stacking,21' justifying that the coverage provided by the insured must be sup-
ported by the premiums received.212 Mississippi, on the other hand, has general-
ly supported both interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking for Class I insureds but
only intrapolicy stacking for Class II insureds. The justification for treating
Class II insureds differently is based on the fact that a multi-vehicle policy was
intended to provide coverage for all vehicles listed under it, while there is no
such expectation when the vehicles are insured under separate policies.
Justice Easley appeared to support both types of stacking for Class II
insureds prior to Mascarella, where he then denied intrapolicy stacking to the
Class II plaintiff. Couple this with the fact that Justice Easley previously agreed
to allow Class II intrapolicy stacking in McDaniel, and the pattern behind his
decision-making process becomes less clear. When contrasting Justice Easley's
pattern with that of Justice Cobb, Justice Cobb appears to be much more consis-
tent in rejecting any type of commercial stacking, for either a Class I or Class II
insured, as evidenced in McDaniel, Glennon, and Mascarella. Consistency is a
good trait for any court and much more so for the state's highest court.
A justice's inconsistent voting pattern can have the potential for exacerbat-
ing problems in future litigation. One basis for the phrase "jackpot justice" is
the perception of judicial uncertainty created by apparently arbitrary decisions.
Having an indication of a justice's philosophy on an issue would add some sta-
bility to the legal process, would enable parties to better plan their transactions,
and might help eliminate some of the "apparent contradictions and ambiguities
within the caselaw. 21
3
B. Mascarella created ambiguity in stacking outcome
Mascarella has not overruled every previous case that allowed uninsured
motorist stacking. To the contrary, the case has virtually no impact on a Class I
insured's ability to stack his own coverage. It is unclear, however, whether
Mascarella overruled any previous case that allowed uninsured motorist stack-
ing.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged that its own case law
regarding uninsured motorist stacking created contradictions and ambiguities.
With so much ambiguity in the law, why did the Mascarella court abandon an
opportunity to specifically overrule those prior cases that conflicted with its
210. But see John F. Buckley, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Legislative Solutions to Settlement
Difficulties, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1408, 1417 (1986) ("Neither logic nor equity supports a denial of stacking on
multivehicle policies, while permitting stacking of policies that list only one vehicle.").
211. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985); LeCuyer v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 519
N.E.2d 263, 264 (Mass. 1988) (insured could stack under separate policies but not under single policy).
212. Compare Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 990 S.W.2d 621, 625-26 (Ky. 1999) (Class II insured
"may not rely on reasonable expectations so as to avoid a policy's liability limitations clause.") (citation omit-
ted), with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ferrante, 518 A.2d 373, 377 (Conn. 1986) (right to stack not tied "to the degree of
intimacy between the claimant and the policyholder.").
213. McDaniel, 807 So. 2d at 396.
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holding? Perhaps their failure to specifically overrule a case such as McDaniel,
which provided a holding nearly opposite to that in Mascarella, is an indication
that a fact pattern still exists under which McDaniel is valid law. After all, the
Mascarella court did end its opinion with the phrase "[u]nder these facts.11
14
This perceived oversight by the court in failing to specifically overrule its prior
decisions may also provide support for the proposition that Mascarella presents
an attempt by the court to rein in what it perceives as excessively liberal com-
mercial stacking decisions, without entirely abandoning commercial stacking for
Class II insureds.
B. Impact on Insurance
Clearly the court will allow multi-vehicle stacking in some instances.
However, the question arises that in those cases when the court will allow multi-
vehicle stacking, which party is entitled to those stacked benefits? The
Mascarella court restricted stacking to "coverage of vehicles covered under his
own fleet policy."2 ' This rule appears to be at odds with prior holdings by this
same court regarding commercial policies and their named insured.
In Cossitt, the court allowed Class II insureds to stack coverage under the
church's policy.16 The court specifically noted that the church should have an
even greater expectation of Class II stacking because there were no Class I
insureds under their policy.1 7
Also compare the Mascarella court's rule with that presented in
Steinwinder.218 Since few individuals would have fleet policies, a rule limiting
stacking to one's "own fleet policy" seems a very restrictive rule, aimed at wide-
ly limiting uninsured motorist stacking under commercial policies. This is fur-
ther evidence that the court has intentionally backed away from its commercial
stacking precedent.
Mascarella also seems to rest future decisions of stacking on the terms of
the insurance policy by limiting commercial policy stacking to named insureds.
Therefore, any business that seeks to provide stacked uninsured motorist cover-
age for its employees must acquire special endorsements naming those employ-
ees as insureds. However, the Ferguson court addressed the "need to protect
insureds because of their uneven bargaining power in dealing with insurance
companies. '  The court described this imbalance in the following manner:
To say that an insured may contract with his insurance company
to limit stacking is disingenuous. Insurance contracts essentially
are contracts of adhesion. The insured has only two choices in
214. Mascarella, 833 So. 2d at 580.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Cossitt, 551 So. 2d at 884.
217. Id.
218. Steinwinder v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Miss. 1999) (holding insurance policy
issued to a corporation covers only the corporation, absent coverage specifically extended to humans associat-
ed with the corporation).
219. Ferguson, 698 So. at 2d at 77.
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'negotiating' the terms of his policy - he may accept the terms
offered by his insurance company, or he may reject them and go
to a different insurance company. When the entire insurance
industry writes its policies to preclude stacking of [uninsured
motorist] coverage, attempting to circumvent case law and defeat
public policy, the insured is denied any choice whatsoever.
220
It appears as though Mascarella leaves the door open for insurance companies to
take advantage of their uneven bargaining power when it comes to uninsured
motorist protections on commercial policies. By leaving stacking decisions
dependent upon the contract language, the court gives more control to insurance
companies who write the contracts.
However, there is an even more problematic result to this decision. With its
decision in Mascarella, the court potentially places the final decision about
stacking in the hands of an individual who may not even be a party to the disput-
ed insurance policy. The Mascarella decision essentially leaves both the insurer
and the insured at the "mercy" of any third party tortfeasors. This outcome is a
result of the Wickline test that makes a third-party tortfeasor's insurance limits
determinative of whether stacking can be allowed.
The issue is more easily explained by example, so consider the following
scenario. Had Mascarella been struck by an uninsured motorist, under apparent-
ly valid precedent of the Mississippi Supreme Court, Mascarella would have
been allowed to stack the entire coverage of his employer's fleet. Under this
scenario, it does not matter that Mascarella has no insurance of his own, because
he is covered by his employer as a Class II permissive user. 1 This is also the
result if Mascarella had been struck by an insured motorist with any level of lia-
bility insurance below the $25,000 uninsured motorist coverage on Mascarella's
vehicle.222 However, because Mascarella was struck by a person with a higher
liability limit ($100,000), Mascarella was denied stacking.
Presumably the only factor that prevented Mascarella from stacking the cov-
erage of his employer's fleet is the level of coverage of the third party involved
in the accident. Such a rule would benefit neither the insurer nor the insured,
and would make it nearly impossible to determine your level of coverage until
after the accident occurred. This seems like a very arbitrary rule that may well
be added to the court's list of contradictions and ambiguities. Such a rule makes
it nearly impossible to guard against risk, which is the purpose behind insurance
in the first place. One observer to Ferguson noted that, in that case, the court
solved one problem by replacing it with another.23 Hopefully, Mascarella does
not have the same effect.
220. Id. at 80.
221. See Harris, 573 So. 2d 646; Stevens, 345 So. 2d at 1041.
222. See Md. Cas. v. Brown, 521 So. 2d at 854.
223. Joseph Sclafani, Stacking the Deck Against the Insurance Industry, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 251, 268 (1998)
("Prior to Ferguson, the court stated that insureds had no choice but to purchase policies which contained anti-
stacking clauses. Now, insureds have no choice but to purchase stacked coverage.").
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